Emissions trading and productivity : firm-level evidence from German manufacturing by Lutz, Benjamin Johannes
Dis cus si on Paper No. 16-067
Emissions Trading and Productivity:  
Firm-level Evidence  
from German Manufacturing
Benjamin Johannes Lutz 
Dis cus si on Paper No. 16-067
Emissions Trading and Productivity:  
Firm-level Evidence  
from German Manufacturing
Benjamin Johannes Lutz 
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp16067.pdf
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von  
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung  
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other  
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly  
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Emissions Trading and Productivity:
Firm-level Evidence from German Manufacturing
Benjamin Johannes Lutz∗
University of Heidelberg and
Centre for European Economic Research
October 6, 2016
Abstract
I study the causal effect of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU
ETS) on the productivity of German manufacturing firms. Using administrative
firm-level data, I estimate robust production functions for narrowly defined indus-
tries. This approach allows for an endogenous dynamic productivity process and
corrects for simultaneous changes in input use or productivity after a firm is reg-
ulated by the EU ETS. After estimating the firm specific productivity, I employ
a difference-in-differences framework in order to identify and quantify the average
treatment effect of the EU ETS on the productivity of regulated firms. The results
suggest no significant negative effect of the EU ETS on productivity. In contrast,
the EU ETS had a positive effect on productivity during the first compliance period.
An alternative identification strategy based on a combination of the difference-in-
differences framework and nearest neighbor matching supports this finding. A sub-
sample analysis provides evidence that the effect of the EU ETS is heterogeneous
across industries.
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1 Introduction
The increased likelihood of disasters linked to climate change, such as floodings, droughts,
and forest fires, has put greenhouse gas reduction targets on policy agendas worldwide.
The European Union (EU) acknowledged the importance of this endeavor by commit-
ting itself to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent until 2020 compared to 1990
figures. In 2005, the EU introduced the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), a
multinational cap-and-trade system, in order to regulate emissions from stationary in-
dustrial installations. The need for effective and efficient policy instruments to mitigate
greenhouse gas emissions requires a thorough ex post evaluation of existing policies. The
analysis of the EU ETS and its impact on regulated firms offers the opportunity to better
understand the mechanisms and consequences of market based policy instruments.
First studies investigating the causal effects of the EU ETS show that it significantly
reduced carbon dioxide emissions of regulated firms in many countries and spurred the
development of new low carbon technologies throughout Europe (Petrick and Wagner,
2014; Wagner, Muuˆls, Martin, and Colmer, 2014; Klemetsen, Rosendahl, and Jakobsen,
2016; Calel and Dechezlepreˆtre, 2016). Despite its positive short and long term effects,
the EU ETS has been the subject of significant political debate due to its potential
adverse impact on the economic performance and competitiveness of regulated fims that
compete on global markets.
From a theoretical point of view, it is not clear whether the EU ETS has an overall
negative effect on the economic performance of regulated firms. The cost of complying
with the EU ETS might decrease revenues and profits. However, according to the induced
innovation hypothesis postulated by Hicks (1932), a relative change in input prices might
create incentives to invest in new technology in order to reduce the use of the increasingly
expensive input. In which way these adjustments affect economic performance depends
on the production technolgy, input and output markets, and other factors that differ
across firms. Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995) put forward a stronger
hypothesis specificly addressing the effects of environmental policy. They argue that
properly designed regulation might not only increase the incentives to develop and adopt
environmentally friendly technology but also consequently might affect competitiveness
in a favorable manner.
Calel and Dechezlepreˆtre (2016) empirically investigate the induced innovation hy-
pothesis and show that the EU ETS has a positive causal impact on low carbon innova-
tion measured by patenting activities. These inventions, but also operational changes or
investments in existing more efficient technologies might increase economic performance
and create an advantage for regulated firms over competitors.
The aim of this study is to analyze the causal effect of the EU ETS on the economic
performance of regulated firms. First, I estimate a structural production function model
in order to obtain the total factor productivity as a robust and comprehensive measure
of economic performance. Secondly, I isolate and quantify the effect of the EU ETS on
the productivity of regulated firms by exploiting treatment variation that results from
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the design of the scheme.
The dispersion in productivity levels across firms and plants has been under inves-
tigation in many areas of economic research, such as industrial organization, labor, and
trade (Syverson, 2011). Internal factors, such as input quality (Van Biesebroeck, 2003),
managerial practice (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007), or R&D activity (Doraszelski and
Jaumandreu (2013)), but also external factors, such as trade competition (De Loecker,
2007) or market regulation (Knittel, 2002) drive firm-level productivity.1
Furthermore, market based environmental regulation has been identified as a driver
of firm-level productivity. Greenstone, List, and Syverson (2012) investigate the im-
pact of air quality regulation on the productivity of U.S. plants. Regulations governing
ozone, particulates, and sulfor dioxide decreased productivity, while regulations limit-
ing carbon monoxide increased productivity. On average, the productivity of polluting
plants decreased by 4.8 percent in regulated areas. Commins, Lyons, Schiffbauer, and
Tol (2011) investigate the correlation between energy taxation and productivity during
the period from 1997 to 2007. They use balance sheet data of European firms from
the sectors manufacturing, energy, and transport. Exploiting industry level variation in
energy taxation, they find a positive correlation between taxation and firm-level pro-
ductivity. In addition, they report a negative correlation between EU ETS participation
and productivity for the first compliance period.
The origins of production function estimation date far back in economic literature.
Marschak and Andrews (1944) investigate the challenges of estimating production func-
tions using OLS. The observed input factors that enter the production function are
chosen by firms. Therefore, unobserved firm specific determinants of production that
are correlated with the choice of inputs are likely to bias OLS estimates. Recent advances
have been made by Olley and Pakes (1996) (henceforth OP) who develop a structural
econometric model of production that corrects for the described simultaneity bias us-
ing investments to proxy unobserved firm specific productivity shocks. Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) (henceforth LP) show that also static inputs can be used as proxies in
the framework of the control function approach. Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015)
(henceforth ACF) build on the basic idea to use observed firm characteristics to proxy
the unobserved productivity, but suggest a more general and more robust estimation
procedure. De Loecker (2013) enhances the ACF model by allowing for an endogenous
productivity process.
The empirical strategy of this paper consists of two steps. First, I follow ACF and
De Loecker (2013) and estimate a robust production function that allows the EU ETS
to simultaneously influence input choice and productivity process in order to obtain an
estimate for firm-level productivity. Secondly, I employ an identification strategy that
relies on treatment variation caused by the design of the EU ETS in order to estimate the
average treatment effect of the EU ETS on the productivity of regulated firms. In order
to balance administrative cost, the EU exempts small and medium sized emitters from
1See Syverson (2011) for a comprehensive survey on the productivity dispersion literature.
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regulation by the EU ETS. As a consequence, there are regulated and unregulated firms
within narrowly defined industries. I exploit this variation by estimating a variety of
difference-in-differences models that isolate the effect of the EU ETS from confounding
factors.
The empirical analysis is based on administrative firm data from Germany. I observe
detailed annual firm-level information for the period from 1999 to 2012. The core of the
dataset is the Cost Structure Survey (henceforth CSS) carried out by the German statis-
tical offices. The CSS contains comprehensive annual information on output produced
and inputs used by firms that operate in the manufacturing sector. It is the founda-
tion of many governmental statistics and reports on the activities of the manufacturing
sector.
The average treatment effect of the EU ETS on the productivity of regulated firms
is statistically significant and ranges between 0.5 and 0.7 percent during the first com-
pliance period depending on the set of control variables. The estimated treatment effect
for the second compliance period is negative, but economically and statistically insignif-
icant. Moreover, annual average treatment effects support the finding that the EU ETS
had an impact during the first compliance period, while the estimated effects are not
significantly different from zero for years of the second compliance period. In order to
investigate the heterogeneity of the treatment effect across industries, I additionally es-
timate the difference-in-differences model for energy intensive two-digit industries with
a sufficient number of regulated firms. The effect of the EU ETS on the productivity
of firms from the food, paper, and chemical industry are not significantly different from
zero. When estimating the model based on data for the industry producing basic metals,
I find a significant positive effect for the first compliance period ranging between 2.4 and
2.9 percent.
In order to relax the parametric assumption of the difference-in-differences model,
I follow Fowlie, Holland, and Mansur (2012) and combine the difference-in-differences
framework with nonparametric nearest neighbor matching. The estimated treatment
effects are statistically significant and positive for the first compliance period. In contrast
to the parametric approach, the difference-in-differences matching model also provides
evidence for a positive effect of the EU ETS during the second compliance period. The
estimated treatment effects are slightly higher in comparison to the parametric approach
and range between 1.5 and 2.7 percent for the first compliance period and 1.2 and
1.4 percent for the second compliance period, respectively. Annual treatment effect
estimates based on the difference-in-differences matching model support the result that
the EU ETS had a stronger effect during the first compliance period. For all models and
specifications, I investigate pretreatment years and show that the productivity evolves
in a parallel fashion across groups.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the regulatory framework
of the EU ETS and gives an overview of the empirical literature concerned with the
causal effects of the EU ETS on firms’ production and investment decisions. Section
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3 describes the underlying official firm data and some descriptive statistics. Section 4
describes the empirical production function estimation and the difference-in-differences
model employed to identify the causal effect of the EU ETS. Section 5 contains the
parameter estimates of the empirical production functions and reports the results of
the difference-in-differences model. Section 6 provides robustness checks with regard
to heterogeneous treatment effects and functional assumptions. Section 7 discusses the
results and concludes.
2 The EU ETS as a natural experiment
In the framework of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU committed itself to reducing its green-
house gas emissions by 20 percent until 2020 compared with 1990 levels. In order to
achieve its emission targets, the EU decided in 2003 to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
from industrial installations by building an EU wide emissions trading system (European
Parliament and Council, 2003). The resulting EU ETS was finally introduced in 2005
and currently regulates about 45 percent of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions caused
by more than 11,000 installations in 31 countries.2
The EU ETS covers emissions from combustion installations and installations that
run energy intensive production processes, such as oil refining, the production of metals,
cement, lime, ceramics, bricks, glass, or paper. The design of the EU ETS excludes
small and medium sized installations. For each of the listed processes, the European
Commission (EC) defined specific capacity thresholds that determine the inclusion into
the EU ETS.3 The regulated installations have to undergo a continuous monitoring,
reporting, and verification process. Once a year, they surrender allowances equivivalent
to their verified emissions.
The first compliance period of the EU ETS lasted from 2005 to 2007. It served as
a pilot phase and was completely decoupled from the following compliance periods. As
a consequence, allowances from the pilot phase were not eligible for surrender in later
years. In 2005, the allowance price ranged between 20 and 30 euros. The price dropped
and finally approached zero in 2007, when market participants realized that there was a
massive oversupply on the market. The pilot phase was followed by second compliance
period that coincided with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol from 2008
to 2012. After the start of the second compliance period, the prices ranged between 20
and 30 euros, however a massive oversupply of allowances resulted in another price drop
during the second half of 2008. As in previous years, the allowances were mostly allocated
for free based on historic emissions. The plummeting demand due to the economic crisis
and the massive use of project based emission credits from the flexible mechanisms of the
Kyoto Protocol did not meet the rather inelastic supply of allowances. The allowance
price remained at a level of around 15 euros until a further shift in the second half of
2The EU ETS operates in the 28 member states of the EU as well as in Iceland, Liechtenstein, and
Norway.
3See European Parliament and Council (2003) Annex I for details on the inclusion criteria.
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2011 when the allowance price dropped below 10 euros. In contrast to 2007, the price
did not converge toward zero since the allowances could also be used for compliance in
subsequent years.4
Regulated firms can comply with the EU ETS in different ways. First, a regulated
firm can surrender allowances to legitimate its emissions. This strategy is dominant
as long as the allowance price is lower than the cost of abatement. Regardless of how
the firm obtains the required allowances, the surrender of allowances negatively affects
its economic performance. Alternatively, a regulated firm can abate greenhouse gas
emissions through a change in input choice, an adjustment of the production technology,
or the development of less emission intensive products. The effect of these abatement
options on the firm’s economic performance is less clear. A change in input choice, such as
a fuel switch, comes at relatively low cost and might not have any additional effects on the
firm. An adjustment of the production technology for example through investments in
energy efficiency however might not only reduce the use of fuel but could also increase the
overall efficiency of the firm. The development of new products also requires investments,
but might create an advantage over competitors. From a theoretical perspective, it is
not clear whether the EU ETS had a significant negative effect on firm performance or
whether secondary effects of abatement measures increased economic performance.
A few very recent studies aim to contribute empirical evidence to the academic and
public debates by investigating the causal effects of the EU ETS on the emissions and
the economic performance of regulated firms. These studies exploit treatment variation
that results from the inclusion criteria of the EU ETS. Since only large emitters are
regulated, there are regulated and unregulated firms within narrowly defined industries
that can be compared. The empirical evidence on the impact of the EU ETS on firm-level
emissions and emission intensity is mixed. Studies using data from Germany, France,
and Norway suggest that the EU ETS significantly reduced greenhouse gas emission
(Petrick and Wagner, 2014; Wagner, Muuˆls, Martin, and Colmer, 2014; Klemetsen,
Rosendahl, and Jakobsen (2016)).5 Jaraite˙ and Di Maria (2016) do not find that the EU
ETS significantly decreased firm-level emissions in Lithuania, but they find a significant
negative effect on emission intensity. So far, there is no evidence that the EU ETS had
a significant negative effect on indicators of economic performance. In contrast, Petrick
and Wagner (2014) find a positive effect of the EU ETS on the revenues of regulated firms
in Germany. Klemetsen, Rosendahl, and Jakobsen, 2016 find a positive effect on value
added and labor productivity of regulated firms in Norway. Calel and Dechezlepreˆtre
(2016) investigate the effect of the EU ETS on patenting. Their findings support that
the EU ETS increased the number of low carbon patents developed by regulated firms.
Bushnell, Chong, and Mansur (2013) examine how the EU ETS affects daily stock
returns of European firms. They show that low allowance prices are associated with low
stock prices for firms in both carbon and electricity intensive industries. Their results
4See Figure A.1 in Appendix A for details.
5Most of the studies investigating the causal effects of the EU ETS are still work under progress and
thus not yet peer reviewed.
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indicate that regulated firms profit from free allocation of allowances and a potential
pass-through of environmental cost. Fabra and Reguant (2014) employ reduced-form
and structural estimations in order to measure the pass-through of costs related to the
EU ETS. Using Spanish electricity market data, they show that the environmental costs
are almost completely passed through to electricity prices.
The aim of this study is to further investigate the impact of the EU ETS on the
economic performance of regulated firms. Debates on potential detrimental effects of
emissions trading on economic performance have accompanied the first two compliance
periods of the EU ETS. Large lobby groups such as the Federation of German Industries
frequently point out that the EU ETS imposes high costs on regulated firms and thus
threatens the competitiveness of European industries (The Federation of German Indus-
tries, 2016).6 This paper gives nuance to these debates with sound empirical evidence
on the causal effects of the EU ETS.
The existing ex post evaluations investigate the effect of the EU ETS on revenues,
value added, and labor productivity. These indicators do not provide a comprehensive
picture of the firm specific economic performance. I employ a structural production
function model in order to obtain a robust estimate of the firm-level total factor pro-
ductivity. This measure for economic performance has been prominently used in the
economic literature to investigate the origins of productivity dispersion.
Following the literature on the ex post evaluation of the EU ETS, I exploit the
inclusion criteria of the EU ETS to develop a sound identification strategy. I compare
the firm specific productivity of firms that are regulated, i.e. belong to the treatment
group, with the productivity of firms that are unregulated, i.e. belong to the control
group, before and after the implementation of the EU ETS. I estimate the treatment
effect employing parametric and nonparametric difference-in-differences models.
3 Empirical strategy
The empirical analysis consists of two subsequent steps.7 First, I estimate a robust
production function that allows for an endogenous productivity process. It corrects for
simultaneous changes in productivity and input use after a firm is regulated by the
EU ETS. The resulting production function is used to recover a firm specific measure of
productivity. Secondly, I assess the causal effect of the EU ETS on firm-level productivity
by employing the difference-in-differences framework.
6The Federation of German Industries is an umbrella association representing the interests of more
than 100,000 firms with about eight million employees.
7I follow the procedure applied by Braguinsky, Ohyama, Okazaki, and Syverson (2015) and employ a
two-step approach in order to investigate the effect of the EU ETS on firm specific productivity changes.
This procedure enables me to control for a large set of confounding factor in a difference-in-differences
framework.
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3.1 Production function estimation
Since the seminal paper of Marschak and Andrews (1944), it has been known that the
estimation of a production function using OLS most likely leads to biased coefficients.
The observed input factors that enter the production function - here, capital and labor
- are chosen by the firm. If there is a firm specific determinant of production, that
influences the input choice and is only visible to the firm itself, the OLS estimates will
be biased.
OP develop a structural econometric model of production that corrects for the
described simultaneity bias by using investments to proxy unobserved firm specific pro-
ductivity shocks. LP enhance this approach and show that also static inputs, such as
materials or energy use, can be used as proxy variables to control for productivity.8 ACF
build on the basic idea that underlies OP and LP, namely using observed firm charac-
teristics to proxy the unobserved productivity, but suggest a more general and more
robust estimation procedure. I estimate the production function following the approach
proposed by ACF.
I assume a Cobb-Douglas production function that takes the following empirical log
linear form for firm i at time t:
yit = βkkit + βllit + ωit + εit, (1)
where yit is the logarithm of gross value added, kit and lit denote the observable inputs
capital and labor expressed in logs, and ωit is the unobservable Hicks neutral productivity
term. The error term εit accounts for random shocks and measurement error and is
assumed to be identically and independently distributed.
I assume, that the capital stock k at time t is determined by the investment i and
the capital stock depreciation in t − 1. The labor market regulation is quite strict in
Germany by granting employees a period of notice that can last several months depending
on employment relationship and industry. Therefore, I also treat labor as a dynamic
input and assume that it is chosen between t − 1 and t. OP, LP, and ACF assume
the dynamics of productivity to evolve according to an exogenous first order Markov
process. I follow De Loecker (2013) and consider a more general model, where I allow
determinants of production to influence future productivity.9 Accordingly, the evolution
8Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes (2007) offer a more detailed technical description of the
differences between these approaches.
9De Loecker (2013) includes exports into the first order Markov process in order to investigate the
learning by exporting hypothesis. The idea to allow for endogenous productivity has been implemented in
several structural econometric production models. Criscuolo and Martin (2009) examine the productivity
of foreign owned plants in the United Kingdom, Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013) study the impact
of R&D on productivity and Aw, Roberts, and Xu (2011) develop a structural model to shed light onto
the joint impact of investments in R&D and exporting on productivity dynamics. Collard-Wexler and
De Loecker (2015) measure the impact of technology choice on industry wide productivity in the U.S.
steel industry. Braguinski, Ohyama, Okazaki, and Syverson (2015) investigate the effect of merger on
productivity. All these studies feature the inclusion of additional production determinants into the first
order Markov process that governs the productivity dynamics.
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of the productivity dynamics is described by
ωit+1 = f(ωit, zit) + ξit, (2)
where the vector z collects determinants of production. The EU ETS might influence
the production and investment decisions of a regulated firm and thus affect future pro-
ductivity. Therefore, the effect of the EU ETS on productivity dynamics should be taken
into account in order to prevent potential bias. I include a dummy variable indicating if
a firm is regulated at time t. Furthermore, I add dummies for exports and R&D, since
it has already been shown by De Loecker (2013), Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013),
and Aw, Roberts, and Xu (2011) that both factors are important drivers of productivity.
Accordingly, the functional relationship between ωit and the determinants of production
is governed by
f(ωit, zit) =
3∑
j
θjω
j
it + γ1etsit + γ2rndit + γ3expit, (3)
where etsit, rndit, and expit denote dummy variables, that indicate if a firm is regulated
by the EU ETS, invests in R&D, or exports, respectively.
In order to deal with correlation between the observed inputs and productivity, I
follow LP and rely on a firm’s use of intermediate inputs m to control for unobserved
productivity shocks that are captured by ωit. I assume, that a firm’s demand for the
intermediate input is given by
mit = gt(kit, lit, ωit, zit). (4)
I assume monotonicity of intermediate inputs in productivity and thus invert gt(·) to
obtain ωit = ht(kit, lit,mit, zit), the proxy for productivity in the empirical production
function, i.e.
yit = βkkit + βllit + ht(kit, lit,mit, zit) + εit. (5)
The parameters βk and βl are not identified in this equation, since they are both included
in ht(·). Following ACF, I non-parametrically estimate this equation to obtain the
expected output E[yit|kit, lit,mit, zit]. As shown in Equation (6), the disposal of εit
enables me to compute the productivity for any possible combination of βk and βl:
ωit(βk, βl) = E[yit|kit, lit,mit, zit]− βkkit − βllit. (6)
As in the ACF approach, I plug ωit(βk, βl) into the law of motion of productivity in
Equation (2) in order to obtain the error term given βk and βl, ξit(βk, βl). The consequent
moment conditions I employ to identify the parameters of the production function are
described by
E
[
ξit(βk, βl)
∣∣∣∣∣kitlit
]
= 0. (7)
As explained above, I assume both capital and labor to be dynamic inputs and thus to be
mean independent of ξit. I employ the generalized method of moments to estimate the
9
parameters. Finally, I use the estimates for βk and βl to recover the implied productivity:
ωˆit = y − βˆkkit − βˆllit. (8)
3.2 Disentangling the effect of the EU ETS
The second step of my empirical analysis is to identify and quantify the causal effect
of the EU ETS by comparing changes in productivity across German manufacturing
firms that are differentially affected by the EU ETS. Due to the inclusion criteria of the
EU ETS, there are regulated and unregulated firms within narrowly defined industries
allowing for a natural experiment framework. The baseline specification of the employed
difference-in-differences model I estimate for the time period from 1999 to 2012 is
ln(Productivityit) = α0 + α1ETSi + α2ETSi × PhaseIt
+ α3ETSi × PhaseIIt + ϕs + δt + λst + uit,
(9)
where ETSi indicates if a firm is regulated by the EU ETS, PhaseIt is equal to one for
years during the first compliance period (2005-2007) and zero otherwise, and PhaseIIt
(2008-2012) is equal to one for years during the second compliance period (2008-2012).
The inclusion of industry fixed effects ϕs adjusts for all constant unobserved determi-
nants of productivity across industries. The year fixed effects δt control for superior
trends in productivity in German manufacturing. λst denotes the full interaction terms
between the industry and year fixed effects and nonparametrically absorbs within indus-
try productivity trends. The error term uit is assumed to be mean zero.
The parameters α2 and α3 on the interaction terms between ETSi and the indicators
for the two compliance periods PhaseIt and PhaseIIt are the estimated effect of the EU
ETS during Phase I and Phase II, respectively. In order to take into account observed
and unobserved heterogeneity across regulated and unregulated firms, I enhance the
baseline specification (Specification I) gradually. First, I add additional control variables,
namely capital stock, employment, energy use, and material use (Specification II). Then,
I add lagged indicators for export and R&D experience (Specification III) and firm fixed
effects that adjust for all constant unobserved determinants of productivity across firms
(Specification IV).
Key to the described identification strategy is the parallel trend assumption: I assume
that in the absence of regulation by the EU ETS, trends in productivity evolve in a
parallel fashion across groups conditional on the included control variables. In order to
motivate this assumption, I investigate the development of productivity across treatment
and control groups during pretreatment years. In particular, I estimate the following
difference-in-differences model for the years before the announcement of the EU ETS,
i.e. the period between 1999 and 2002:
ln(Productivityit) = α0 + α1ETSit + α2ETSit × I(t > 2000)
+ ϕs + δt + λst + uit,
(10)
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where I(t > 2000) equals one for the years 2001 and 2002. Therefore, the parameter
α2 is a placebo treatment effect. The parallel trend assumption would be violated,
if α2 is significantly different from zero. I apply this procedure to all aforementioned
specifications of the difference-in-differences model.
The model described in Equation 9 provides the average treatment effects of the EU
ETS on firm specific productivity for the first and the second compliance period. Within
the two compliance periods, there was a high variation in the EUA price. High prices
might have provoked stronger reactions by regulated firms and thus might have caused
a heterogeneous treatment effect over time. In order to examine, if the effect of the
EU ETS on productivity changes over time within the compliance periods, I estimate a
modified difference-in-differences model that provides annual treatment effects:
ln(Productivityit) = α0 + α1ETSit +
2012∑
k=2000
αkETSit × I(t = k)
+ ϕs + δt + λst + uit,
(11)
where I(t=k) is an indicator function associated with the year t. The estimated param-
eters for the years from 2000 to 2004 can be interpreted as placebo treatment effects.
They will shed light onto the validity of the underlying assumptions of the difference-in-
differences model. If these are significantly different from zero, the model fails to identify
the effect of the EU ETS. The estimated parameters for the years from 2005 to 2012 will
provide annual average treatment effects. I estimate this modified model applying the
same specifications as described above (Specification I - IV).
4 Data and preliminary analysis
This study is based on official firm data from Germany. Combining different adminis-
trative data sources, I observe detailed annual firm-level information on general charac-
teristics, cost structure, energy use, and EU ETS obligations for the time period from
1999 to 2012.
The core of the dataset is the Cost Structure Survey (CSS) carried out by the Fed-
eral Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the German Federal States. The CSS
contains comprehensive annual information on output produced and inputs employed
by firms that operate in the manufacturing sector. The CSS includes all German manu-
facturing firms with more than 500 employees. For firms with at least 20 and less than
500 employees, the statistical offices collect data from a large random sample. 10The
participation in the CSS is mandatory by law and results are checked for consistency and
verified by the statistical offices. It is the foundation for many governmental statistics
and reports on the activities of the manufacturing sector.
10Similar data sets from other countries have been used in the productivity dispersion literature.
Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013) for example employ the Spanish equivalent in order to examine the
effect of R&D on firm-level productivity
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The random sample of firms with more than 20 and less than 500 employees is
renewed once every few years - in the sample period at hand, the random sample has
been drawn in 1999, 2003, 2008, and 2012. The random sample is stratified by the
number of employees and industry affiliation. Firms with more than 20 and less than
500 employees are always surveyed if they belong to concentrated industries.
In order to add information on employment, exports, investments, and entry and exit
to the CSS, I link the CSS with data from the German production census Official Firm
Data for Germany (Amtliche Firmendaten fu¨r Deutschland - AFiD). The production
census is also maintained by the German statistical offices and is obligatory for all
manufacturing firms with more than 20 employees. Furthermore, I merge the CSS
with the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) in order to identify firms that are
regulated by the EU ETS.11 The resulting unbalanced panel comprises annual data of
about 15,000 firms for the years from 1999 to 2012. Due to the dynamic structure of
the model, I only consider firms that reported in at least two consecutive years. The
industry classification system corresponds to ISIC Revision 4.
The measure for output is the firm’s gross value added which is obtained from the
CSS and deflated using two-digit ISIC deflators.12 The labor input is constructed by tak-
ing the annual average of the number of employees reported monthly in the production
census. The annual average offers a more detailed view on employment in comparison to
the number of employees collected at the reporting date of the CSS. I use detailed invest-
ment data contained in the production census in order to compute the capital stock for
each firm based on the perpetual inventory method.13 The material expenditures stem
from the CSS and are deflated by type using deflators for the manufacturing sector.14
In addition, the firms participating in the CSS are asked to report R&D expenditures.
These comprise the cost of internal R&D activities, but also joint activities with external
research centers and laboratories. I consider a firm to conduct R&D activities, if the
total R&D expenditures are positive. The production census provides export revenues
on the firm-level. Analogously I consider a firm to be exporting if it reports positive
export revenues.
In Table 1, I report descriptive statistics to characterize the group of firms regulated
by the EU ETS and the group of unregulated firms. Firms regulated by the EU ETS
are on average larger in terms of output produced and inputs used. This is due to the
design of the EU ETS that only regulates large emitters. There is a relatively high
number of small and medium sized firms in the data set. Therefore, statistics on the
control group and the entire data set show positively skewed distributions on the main
characteristics.15 On average, the firms of the manufacturing sector were expanding
11See Annex A for more information on the merge of CSS, AFiD, and EUTL.
12The data on price indices can be retrieved from the web portal of the Federal Statistical Office:
https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online Producer Price Index 61241-0004.
13This procedure has been used by many other papers estimating production functions, as for instance
Olley and Pakes (1996). See Annex B for details on the computation of the capital stock.
14See footnote 11.
159 in Appendix A reports detailed descriptive statistics on the entire data set showing percentiles and
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until the economic crisis led to decreasing demand and contractions in 2009. From 2010
to 2012, the firms rapidly recovered and continued to grow on average.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
EU ETS firms Unregulated firms
Mean SD N Mean SD N
2000
Gross value added (EUR 1000) 270,956 930,476 339 19,323 186,228 14,768
Output (EUR 1000) 623,951 2,348,248 338 45,760 415,962 14,660
Capital stock (EUR 1000) 277,470 851,531 339 15,825 117,142 14,700
Energy use (MWh) 1,139,299 4,880,839 339 21,816 293,735 14,767
Number of employees 2,339 8,429 339 248 1,661 14,767
R&D expenditure (EUR 1000) 35,334 215,372 339 1,636 41,329 14,768
Exports (EUR 1000) 417,213 2,165,096 339 21,343 324,984 14,767
2005
Gross value added (EUR 1000) 296,848 1,173,846 383 19,685 178,177 13,475
Output (EUR 1000) 711,907 2,778,015 381 50,103 443,246 13,223
Capital stock (EUR 1000) 278,734 930,450 383 16,143 117,655 13,389
Energy use (MWh) 1,291,501 4,469,597 383 19,937 169,754 13,286
Number of employees 2,260 8,013 383 241 1,622 13,474
R&D expenditure (EUR 1000) 44,205 253,976 383 1,913 45,681 13,475
Exports (EUR 1000) 503,908 2,511,781 383 26,790 370,656 13,474
2010
Gross value added (EUR 1000) 270,600 1,050,857 440 18,274 201,533 14,959
Output (EUR 1000) 696,410 3,015,317 438 47,815 487,422 14,812
Capital stock (EUR 1000) 254,298 814,679 440 14,310 109,372 14,884
Energy use (MWh) 1,595,464 6,518,306 440 17,217 131,277 14,818
Number of employees 1,936 7,032 440 220 1,460 14,944
R&D expenditure (EUR 1000) 42,431 258,910 440 1,715 41,345 14,959
Exports (EUR 1000) 540,497 3,056,996 440 26,037 372,078 14,945
Notes: Gross value added, output (production value), wages and salaries, R&D expenditure, exports and capital stock are denoted
in EUR 1000. Energy use is denoted in MWh. Source: Research Data Centres of the Statistical Offices Germany (2014): Official
Firm Data for Germany (AFiD) - Cost Structure Survey, AFiD-Panel Industrial Units, and AFiD-Module Use of Energy, own
calculations.
Table 2 shows the distribution of regulated and unregulated firms across two-digit
industries in the merged data set. While combustion installations that generate heat or
power can be found in most industries, the firms that operate process regulated installa-
tions are mainly concentrated in the industries manufacturing food (10), beverages (11),
paper (17), coke and refined petroleum products (19), chemicals (20), pharmaceutical
products (21), rubber and plastic (22), other nonmetallic mineral products (23), and
basic metals (24).
higher moments of the distributions.
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Table 2: Number of observations by industry: total and regulated firms
2005 2008 2012
NACE Industry Total Regulated Total Regulated Total Regulated
10 Food products 1,528 44 1,903 52 1,888 53
11 Beverages 285 8 260 10 245 11
12 Tobacco products 22 1 21 2 21 2
13 Textiles 424 5 414 7 333 4
14 Wearing apparel 268 0 215 0 185 0
15 Leather and related products 118 0 103 0 84 0
16 Wood and products of wood and cork 361 11 458 19 377 16
17 Paper and paper products 359 63 435 72 435 78
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 330 2 359 1 329 3
19 Coke and refined petroleum products 44 15 47 17 45 16
20 Chemicals and chemical products 729 49 854 56 846 54
21 Pharmaceutical products 184 8 201 8 185 6
22 Rubber and plastic products 806 10 978 9 812 14
23 Other nonmetallic mineral products 733 100 792 117 687 119
24 Basic metals 545 32 642 32 646 35
25 Fabricated metal products 1,522 2 2,149 4 1,907 2
26 Computer, electronic and optical products 694 5 831 4 694 4
27 Electrical equipment 808 4 970 4 980 4
28 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 2,226 6 2,585 8 2,138 7
29 Motor vehicles, trailers, and semitrailers 663 10 701 9 541 9
30 Other transport equipment 257 5 238 5 212 5
31 Furniture 382 0 397 0 351 0
32 Other manufacturing 452 3 587 3 547 2
33 Repair and installation of mach. and equip. 118 0 108 0 623 1
– Total 13,858 383 16,248 439 15,111 445
Notes: Number of firms for the first year of Phase I of the EU ETS (2005), the first year of Phase II (2008) and the last year
of Phase II (2012) that is also the last year I observe. Source: Research Data Centres of the Statistical Offices Germany (2014):
Official Firm Data for Germany (AFiD) - Cost Structure Survey and AFiD-Panel Industrial Units, own calculations.
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5 Results
In this section, I first report the production function estimates based on the ACF ap-
proach I described in Section 3.1. Secondly, I will show the results of the difference-in-
differences model I outlined in Section 3.2 in order to shed light onto the causal effect
of the EU ETS on firm-level productivity.
5.1 Production function estimates
I estimate value added production functions for two-digit industries within manufactur-
ing using data for the time period from 1999 to 2012. Table 3 reports the results of the
ACF model along with estimates based on standard OLS regressions, the total number
of firms and the total number of observations for the entire sample period.
Table 3: Output elasticities
OLS estimates ACF estimates
NACE Industry # Firms # Observ. Capital Labor Capital Labor
10 Food products 4,342 22,981 0.349
(0.004)
0.643
(0.005)
0.369
(0.024)
0.541
(0.015)
11 Beverages 664 3,889 0.137
(0.013)
0.985
(0.020)
0.181
(0.065)
0.949
(0.044)
13 Textile 1,089 6,030 0.183
(0.006)
0.885
(0.010)
0.195
(0.022)
0.867
(0.038)
15 Leather and related
products
253 1,582 0.249
(0.012)
0.834
(0.019)
0.237
(0.035)
0.839
(0.055)
16 Wood and products of
wood and cork
1,261 5,640 0.175
(0.006)
0.884
(0.010)
0.180
(0.028)
0.844
(0.038)
17 Paper and paper products 1,017 5,532 0.214
(0.007)
0.867
(0.010)
0.289
(0.034)
0.788
(0.052)
18 Printing and reproduction of
recorded media
1,207 4,704 0.152
(0.007)
0.900
(0.010)
0.257
(0.087)
0.613
(0.196)
20 Chemicals and chemical
products
1,707 10,311 0.241
(0.006)
0.820
(0.008)
0.258
(0.024)
0.779
(0.039)
22 Rubber and plastic products 2,652 11,864 0.183
(0.004)
0.881
(0.006)
0.198
(0.014)
0.865
(0.020)
23 Other nonmetallic
mineral products
2,061 10,836 0.249
(0.005)
0.792
(0.007)
0.225
(0.016)
0.820
(0.019)
24 Basic metals 1,269 8,088 0.176
(0.006)
0.868
(0.009)
0.190
(0.026)
0.855
(0.036)
25 Fabricated metal
products
5,791 24,835 0.148
(0.003)
0.926
(0.004)
0.144
(0.008)
0.925
(0.013)
27 Electrical equipment 2,610 11,807 0.161
(0.005)
0.909
(0.007)
0.209
(0.054)
0.834
(0.079)
28 Machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
6,760 31,085 0.092
(0.003)
0.994
(0.004)
0.091
(0.007)
0.988
(0.010)
29 Motor vehicles, trailers,
and semitrailers
1,553 8,451 0.164
(0.006)
0.897
(0.008)
0.164
(0.006)
0.886
(0.023)
31 Furniture 1,256 5,544 0.156
(0.006)
0.927
(0.009)
0.168
(0.050)
0.853
(0.089)
Notes: All parameter estimates are significant at the 5 % level. Standard errors are computed by employing the block bootstrap
algorithm with 500 replications. I employ cluster bootstrap to obtain standard errors. Source: Research Data Centres of the
Statistical Offices Germany (2014): Official Firm Data for Germany (AFiD) - Cost Structure Survey and AFiD-Panel Industrial
Units own calculations.
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The ACF model is implemented employing the general method of moments procedure
shown in Section 3.1. The standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and obtained
by applying the block bootstrap treating each set of firm observations together as an
independent and identical draw from the population of firms.16 The block bootstrap
takes into account that the multiple observations of a firm are correlated over time
in some unknown way and corrects for the two-step nature of the general method of
moments estimator.
The number of firms within the industries ranges between 253 (leather and related
products) and 6,760 (machinery and equipment) firms during the sample period from
1999 to 2012, while the total number of observations ranges between 1,582 (leather and
related products) and 31,085 (machinery and equipment). The precision of the estimates
tends to increase with the number of observations. All estimated coefficients of the ACF
model are statistically significant at conventional levels.
The production functions vary significantly across industries reflecting the hetero-
geneity within the manufacturing sector. All industries have in common that the coef-
ficient on labor is larger than the coefficient on capital. A comparison of the ACF and
the OLS parameters shows that for most industries, the ACF coefficient on capital is
larger, while the ACF coefficient on labor is smaller. This is in line with the findings of
OP and LP. They show that the endogeneity of the input choice results in an upward or
downward bias depending on how fast a firm can adjust the input use. OLS coefficients
on relatively inflexible inputs such as capital tend to be biased towards zero, while co-
efficients on relatively flexible inputs are positively biased. The returns to scale range
from 0.87 (printing and reproduction of recorded media) to 1.13 (beverages).
I compute the firm-level productivity as the residual from the production function
as described in Equation 8. Figure 1 shows the indexed mean productivity for two-
digit industries within manufacturing. The mean productivity evolves quite differently
over time across two-digit industries again reflecting the heterogeneity across indus-
tries within manufacturing. While some industries record increasing mean productivity
(e.g. food products, electrical equipment, machinery and equipment, and motor vehicles,
trailers, and semitrailers), others show decreasing mean productivity (e.g. printing and
reproduction of recorded media and basic metals, and furniture).
The economic crisis did not affect manufacturing in Germany as seriously as in other
European countries. However, demand for German goods decreased significantly in 2009.
This development is also reflected in a drop in productivity of most two-digit industries.
Firms cannot smoothly adapt their input choice to demand shocks. Therefore, a rapid
decline in demand decreases capacity utilization and consequently productivity.
The different developments in productivity across industries are taken into account
in the second stage of my empirical analysis. The various specifications of the difference-
16This approach has been first proposed by LP in this context. Subsequent studies that apply LP or
ACF follow this strategy, see e.g. De Loecker and Warzinski (2012), De Loecker (2013), and Collard-
Wexler and De Loecker (2015). More information on the bootstrap can be found in Horowitz (2001)
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in-differences model always include industry and year fixed effects as well as a full set
of interaction terms. In this way, the model nonparametrically captures heterogeneous
developments in productivity across industries and over time.
Figure 1: Indexed mean productivity (base year 1999).
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5.2 Estimated treatment effects
Table 4 reports the results of the difference-in-differences model described in Section 3.2.
The first column shows the estimates of Specification I that includes fixed effects and full
interaction terms on industry and year. Columns two and three report the results for
Specification II and Specification III that include an enhanced set of control variables.
The results of Specification IV that adds firm fixed effects are shown in the last column.
The displayed treatment effects can be interpreted as semi-elasticities.
Table 4: Difference-in-differences treatment effects.
I II III IV
Phase I 0.007∗∗
(0.003)
0.005∗
(0.003)
0.005
(0.003)
0.007∗∗
(0.003)
Phase II -0.000
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.003)
Pretreatment
analysis
0.005
(0.003)
0.004
(0.003)
0.005
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.003
Fixed effects
Industry × × ×
Year × × × ×
Industry year inter-
action terms
× × × ×
Firm ×
Additional controls
Capital, labor, en-
ergy use, and materials
× × ×
Indicator for export
and RnD experience
× ×
# Firms
(1999-2012)
34,373 34,215 32,302 32,302
# Observations
(1999-2012)
173,178 172,065 153,823 153,823
Notes: Standard errors are computed by employing the block bootstrap algorithm with 500 replications. *** denotes significance
at the 99 percent level. ** denotes significance at the 95 percent level. * denotes significance at the 90 percent level. Source:
Research Data Centres of the Statistical Offices Germany (2014): Official Firm Data for Germany (AFiD) - Cost Structure Survey,
AFiD-Panel Industrial Units, and AFiD-Module Use of Energy, own calculations.
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) point out that conventional standard er-
rors for difference-in-differences applications with long time series and a high serial cor-
relation in the outcome variable are inconsistent. Since the considered time series is
rather long (14 years) and productivity is highly persistent, I refrain from applying con-
ventional standard errors. According to Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) the
bootstrap performs well if the cross section is sufficiently large and the serial correlation
in the data is taken into account. I follow their recommendation and employ the block
bootstrap in order to obtain adequate standard errors for the estimated treatment effects
clustered at the firm-level.
Specifications I, II, and IV show a significant positive effect of the EU ETS on
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firm-level productivity ranging between 0.5 and 0.7 percent during the first compliance
period. The estimated treatment effects for the second compliance periods are nega-
tive, but rather small and statistically insignificant. In order to examine the parallel
trend assumption, I estimate the four specifications for the pretreatment time period
from 1999 to 2002 treating 2001 as the implementation year of the EU ETS. The re-
sults of the pretreatment analysis are report in the third row of Table 4. None of the
estimated placebo effects is statistically significant. Consequently, I fail to reject the
hypothesis that the key identifying assumption holds strongly supporting the validity of
the difference-in-differences approach in this setting.
In addition to the average treatment effect for the entire compliance period, I also
estimate the annual effects of the EU ETS as shown in Equation 11 in order to investigate
variations in the impact over time. Figure 2 displays the results of the annual treatment
effects model. The horizontal line denotes the treatment effect while the horizontal bar
denotes the twofold standard deviation. Per year, four bars are shown corresponding to
the four specifications outlined above. Most estimated treatment effects are statistically
insignificant. However, the annual treatment effects of Phase I are slightly higher in
comparison to the pretreatment and Phase II years.
Figure 2: Annual treatment effects.
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Notes: Annual treatment effects and confidence bands (2 times standard error) for Specification I - Specification IV. Specification
III and Specification IV can only be estimated for the period from 2000 to 2012. I employ block bootstrap to obtain standard
errors. Source: Research Data Centres of the Statistical Offices Germany (2014): Official Firm Data for Germany (AFiD) - Cost
Structure Survey and AFiD-Panel Industrial Units, own calculations.
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6 Robustness checks
6.1 Heterogeneous treatment effects
The industries within the manufacturing sector differ with regard to many aspects.
They produce very different goods, face different market conditions on input and output
markets and face different kinds of regulation. As a consequence, the effect of the EU
ETS on the regulated firms might vary across industries. The average treatment effect
over all industries therefore does not provide the full picture of the impact of the EU
ETS.
For this reason, I analyze the effect of the EU ETS at the two-digit industry level.
I focus on the industries manufacturing food products (10), paper and paper products
(17), chemicals and chemical products (20), rubber and plastic products (22), other non-
metallic mineral products (23) as well as basic metals (24). These industries provide a
sufficient number of observations in the group of the regulated firms (see Table 2). I es-
timate the difference-in-differences model depicted in Equation 9 and further investigate
the validity of the parallel trend assumption by estimating a placebo treatment effect
during the pretreatment period from 1999 to 2002 as described by Equation 10. The
standard errors are again obtained by applying the block bootstrap algorithm.
Table 5 reports the results for Specification I and II and Table 6 shows the results
for Specification III and IV, respectively. Considering the first compliance period, the
estimated treatment effects for the industries manufacturing food (10), paper (17), and
chemicals (20) are mostly positive, but statistically insignificant. During the second
compliance period, the effect of the EU ETS was statistically insignificant, but the signs
varied across the three industries. The estimated treatment effect was positive for the
industries producing food (10) and chemicals (20), while the effect was negative for the
paper industry (17). The results for the industries producing rubber and plastic (22)
and other nonmetallic mineral products (23) indicate that the parallel trend assumption
is violated for some specifications. Therefore, I refrain from interpreting the results
for these industries. The EU ETS had a significant positive effect on the firms of the
industry producing basic metals (24) during the first compliance period. The effect
ranges between 2.4 and 2.9 percent. During the second compliance period, the EU ETS
did not significantly influence the productivity of the regulated firms. For this industry,
the pretreatment analysis supports the parallel trend assumption.
The subsample analysis sheds light on the heterogeneity of the treatment effect,
however, this empirical strategy comes along with a reduction of the sample size. The
number of firms ranges from 1,707 (paper industry, 17) to 4,342 (food industry, 10) in
the period from 1999 to 2012, while the total number of observation ranges from 10,310
(paper industry, 17) to 22,981 (food industry, 10). As a consequence, the precision of
the estimates decreases in comparison to the analysis using the full sample.
The results of the subsample analysis support the hypothesis that the effect of the
EU ETS is not homogeneous across industries.
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Table 5: Difference-in-differences treatment effects - subsample analysis (I/II).
I II
NACE Industry Pre-
treatment
Phase I Phase II Pre-
treatment
Phase I Phase II
10 Food prod-
ucts
0.019
(0.017)
0.002
(0.009)
0.002
(0.010)
0.019
(0.018)
0.001
(0.009)
0.003
(0.010)
17 Paper and pa-
per products
0.013
(0.010)
0.009
(0.012)
-0.004
(0.013)
0.014
(0.010)
0.008
(0.012)
-0.005
(0.013)
20 Chemicals and
chemical
products
-0.001
(0.005)
0.002
(0.007)
0.007
(0.007)
-0.001
(0.005)
0.002
(0.006)
0.005
(0.006)
22 Rubber and
plastic prod-
ucts
0.002
(0.007)
0.005
(0.005)
0.011∗
(0.006)
0.014
(0.010)
0.001
(0.006)
0.007
(0.005)
23 Other non-
metallic min-
eral products
-0.004
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.004)
-0.006
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.004)
24 Basic metals 0.001
(0.004)
0.029∗∗∗
(0.007)
-0.005
(0.010)
-0.001
(0.004)
0.026∗∗∗
(0.007)
-0.009
(0.010)
Notes: Standard errors are computed by employing the block bootstrap algorithm with 500 replications. *** denotes significance
at the 99 percent level. ** denotes significance at the 95 percent level. * denotes significance at the 90 percent level. Source:
Research Data Centres of the Statistical Offices Germany (2014): Official Firm Data for Germany (AFiD) - Cost Structure Survey,
AFiD-Panel Industrial Units, and AFiD-Module Use of Energy, own calculations.
Table 6: Difference-in-differences treatment effects - subsample analysis (II/II).
III IV
NACE Industry Pre-
treatment
Phase I Phase II Pre-
treatment
Phase I Phase II
10 Food prod-
ucts
0.022
(0.018)
0.004
(0.010)
0.006
(0.011)
0.021
(0.017)
0.012
(0.009)
0.008
(0.010)
17 Paper and pa-
per products
0.012
(0.009)
0.008
(0.013)
-0.006
(0.014)
0.013
(0.009)
0.012
(0.013)
-0.005
(0.007)
20 Chemicals and
chemical prod-
ucts
0.002
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.006)
0.003
(0.006)
0.001
(0.004)
0.001
(0.006)
0.005
(0.007)
22 Rubber and
plastic prod-
ucts
0.026∗∗
(0.012)
-0.002
(0.007)
0.004
(0.006)
0.020∗
(0.010)
0.002
(0.006)
0.008
(0.006)
23 Other non-
metallic min-
eral products
-0.007
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.004)
-0.007∗∗
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.004)
24 Basic metals 0.002
(0.004)
0.025∗∗∗
(0.007)
-0.011
(0.010)
-0.002
(0.004)
0.024∗∗∗
(0.008)
-0.013
(0.010)
Notes: Standard errors are computed by employing the block bootstrap algorithm with 500 replications. *** denotes significance
at the 99 percent level. ** denotes significance at the 95 percent level. * denotes significance at the 90 percent level. Source:
Research Data Centres of the Statistical Offices Germany (2014): Official Firm Data for Germany (AFiD) - Cost Structure Survey,
AFiD-Panel Industrial Units, and AFiD-Module Use of Energy, own calculations.
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6.2 Relaxing functional form assumptions
The parametric difference-in-differences model described in Section 3.2 relies on func-
tional form assumptions on the treatment and outcome model that might affect the
estimated treatment effect. When including observable firm characteristics into the
difference-in-differences model, I implicitly assume a linear relationship between the
control variables, the treatment, and the outcome. In order to relax this assumption,
I follow Fowlie, Holland, and Mansur (2012) and combine the difference-in-differences
framework with nonparametric nearest neighbor matching. Based on the firm character-
istics I observe, I match treated firms with similar untreated firms. The resulting control
group only contains firms that are similar to the firms of the treatment group.
Following Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) and Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and
Todd (1998) the difference-in-difference matching estimator is described by
τˆ =
1
N
∑
j∈I1
{
(ln(Productivity)jt′(1)− ln(Productivity)jt0(0))
−
∑
k∈I0
wjk(ln(Productivity)kt′(0)− ln(Productivity)kt0(0))
}
.
(12)
The set of firms regulated by the EU ETS is defined as I1, while the unregulated firms
are collected in set I0. There are N regulated firms indexed by j, the unregulated
firms are indexed by k. The weight wjk takes the value one, if a firm of the control
has been matched and zero otherwise. Following Fowlie, Holland, and Mansur (2012),
I identify the nearest neighbor using the Mahalanobis distance to measure similarity
between firms. I perform matching with replacement linking each treated firm with one
and five similar firms of the control group. Similar firms are identified using information
of the pretreatment year 2000 on output, capital stock, labor, energy use, material use
as well as indicators for export and R&D experience. Due to the strong heterogeneity
across industries, I exactly match on the two-digit industry classification.
Similarly to the parametric difference-in-differences approach, I assume that the mean
productivities of treatment and control group evolve in a parallel fashion over time in
the absence of the regulation by the EU ETS. In order to investigate the validity of
this assumption, I conduct a pretreatment analysis using data from 1999 to 2002 with a
placebo treatment in 2001.
Table 7 reports the results of the pretreatment analysis and the estimated treat-
ment effects based on the difference-in-difference matching estimator. The estimates
are based on a comparison between the pretreatment period from 2001 to 2002 with
each compliance period of the EU ETS. I compute standard errors that are robust with
respect to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity following Abadie and Imbens (2006).
The placebo treatment effects estimated for the year 2001 are close to zero and statis-
tically insignificant. The treatment effect estimated for the first compliance period is
statistically different from zero. When matching with the nearest neighbor, I obtain an
average treatment effect of 2.7 percent. The preferred specification of the parametric
difference-in-differences model provides a productivity increasing effect of 0.7 percent.
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Adding the five closest neighbors to the control group reduces the treatment effect to 1.5
percent. Also for the second compliance period, the nearest neighbor matching shows
significantly positive estimates. The treatment effect ranges between 1.2 percent (one
neighbor) and 1.4 (five neighbors). These results differ from the results of my main
model that does not provide any evidence for a significant effect of the EU ETS during
the second compliance period. These differing outcomes might be explained by the dif-
ferent designs of the two identification strategies. Applying the matching algorithm, I
avoid the functional assumptions of the parametric difference-in-differences model and
I only compare the regulated firms with very similar unregulated firms. Furthermore,
I am only able to compare firms that stay in the sample during the considered time
periods from 1999 to 2008 and from 1999 to 2012, respectively.
Apart from the average treatment effect for each compliance period, I also estimate
annual treatment effects in order to investigate the development of the treatment effect
over time. The pretreatment year 2000 serves as the base year for this approach. For the
pretreatment years from 2001 to 2004, I expect the estimated treatment effects not to
be statistically different from zero. Figure 3 shows the annual treatment effects and the
corresponding confidence bands. From 2001 to 2004, the estimated treatment effect is
not significantly different from zero. During the first compliance period, the confidence
bands slightly widen, however the estimated treatment effects are statistically different
from zero. During the first compliance period, the estimated treatment effect ranges
between 1.4 percent (2006) and 3.8 percent (2007) when matching with the nearest
neighbor and between 1.1 percent (2006) and 1.8 percent (2008) when matching with
the five nearest neighbors. The estimated treatment effects for the second compliance
period are closer to zero and statistically insignificant.
The results of the difference-in-differences nearest neighbor matching approach sup-
port the results of the parametric difference-in-differences model.
Table 7: Nonparametric difference-in-differences treatment effects.
Pretreatment
analysis
Phase I Phase II
One neighbor 0.006
(0.004)
0.027∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.012∗
(0.006)
Five neighbors 0.004
(0.003)
0.015∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.014∗∗∗
(0.005)
# Observations 11,609 3,212 6,757
Notes: The computed standard errors are based on Abadie and Imbens (2006). *** denotes significance at the 99 percent level.
** denotes significance at the 95 percent level. * denotes significance at the 90 percent level. Source: Research Data Centres of
the Statistical Offices Germany (2014): Official Firm Data for Germany (AFiD) - Cost Structure Survey, AFiD-Panel Industrial
Units, and AFiD-Module Use of Energy, own calculations.
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Figure 3: Annual treatment effects - NN matching.
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
       2001            2002            2003             2004            2005            2006            2007             2008            2009            2010             2011            2012  
Notes: Annual treatment effects and confidence bands (2 times standard error) for nearest neighbor matching with one and five
neighbors. As base year for the difference-in-difference approach serves the year 2000. The computed standard errors are based
on Abadie and Imbens (2006). Source: Research Data Centres of the Statistical Offices Germany (2014): Official Firm Data for
Germany (AFiD) - Cost Structure Survey and AFiD-Panel Industrial Units, own calculations.
7 Concluding discussion
Debates on potential detrimental effects of emissions trading on economic performance
have accompanied the first two compliance periods of the EU ETS. This paper investi-
gated the causal effect of the EU ETS on the total factor productivity of regulated firms.
The productivity is measured as residual from a structural production function estimate
that is robust with regard to endogeneity and allows the EU ETS to simultaneously
influence input choice and the dynamic productivity process. I identify the effect of the
EU ETS on firm-level productivity by exploiting treatment variation that occurs due to
the design of the EU ETS. In order to releave small and medium sized emitters of car-
bon dioxide from the regulatory burden, only large emitters have been included into the
EU ETS. I examine changes in the firm-level productivity by comparing regulated and
unregulated firms before and after the implementation of the EU ETS. In particular, I
estimate a variety of parametric difference-in-differences models including different sets
of explanatory variables and fixed effects in order to eliminate the influence of potential
confounding factors.
The estimated treatment effects for the first compliance period of the EU ETS are
mostly statistically significant and positive. No effect of the EU ETS could be observed
for the second compliance period using the parametric difference-in-differences model.
Estimated treatment effects based on a combination of the difference-in-differences frame-
work and nearest neighbor matching support the findings for the first compliance period,
but also show a significant positive effect of the EU ETS on productivity during the sec-
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ond compliance period.
So far, there is no scientific study investigating the effect of the EU ETS on the
total factor productivity of regulated firms. The very recent ex post evaluations of
the EU ETS mostly find a significant reduction of carbon dioxide emissions (Petrick
and Wagner, 2014; Wagner, Muuˆls, Martin, and Colmer, 2014; Klemetsen, Rosendahl,
and Jakobsen, 2016) and emission intensity (Petrick and Wagner, 2014; Jaraite˙ and Di
Maria, 2016) caused by the EU ETS. With regard to other firm characteristics, Petrick
and Wagner, 2014 find a positive of the EU ETS on the revenue of German firms and
Klemetsen, Rosendahl, and Jakobsen, 2016 find a positive effect on value added and labor
productivity. Jaraite˙ and Di Maria (2016) provide empirical evidence for a positive effect
of the EU ETS on the renewal of installed capital stock. Wagner, Muuˆls, Martin, and
Colmer, 2014 find that the EU ETS had a negative effect on employment. Calel and
Dechezlepreˆtre (2016) investigate the effect of the EU ETS on patenting and find that
it spurred low-carbon patents.
The results of this study are basically in line with these findings that are based
on data from different European countries. Investments in more efficient capital stock
triggered by the EU ETS could have reduced the use of static inputs such as energy and
labor and thus might have increased the overall productivity. Innovative new products
that require less energy use in the production process might have increased productivity
and output as well.
There are several factors that might have influenced the analysis and should be
kept in mind when discussing the results and their implications. First, I would like
to point to the fact that the productivity measure employed in this study is revenue
based. I use specific two-digit price indicators to deflate outputs produced and inputs
employed, however there might be still changes driven by price developments. This
has implications for the interpretation of the causal effect of the EU ETS. If firms are
able to pass additional cost on to customers, then the higher output price due to a
cost pass through could be reflected as a productivity gain. As shown by Bushnell,
Chong, and Mansur (2012) and Fabra and Reguant (2014), emissions costs are passed
through to electricity prices by utilities. It is likely that at least in some industries of
the manufacturing sector firms are also able to pass through costs to product prices. A
solution to this problem would be to estimate a quantity based productivity measure
based on physical units of inputs and outputs. The estimation of a quantity based
production function for multi-product firms is in general feasible (De Loecker, Goldberg,
Khandelwal, and Pavcnik, 2016). However, this approach requires a sufficient number
of single-product firms within narrowly defined industries. Using only German data, I
do not observe enough single-product firms in order to estimate such a model.
A further issue that might influence the results of my analysis is the exit of firms
caused by the EU ETS. If the EU ETS forced unproductive regulated firms out of the
market, then the average productivity would increase in the group of the regulated
firms even if the active firms remained on the same productivity level. Regrettably,
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the CSS is an unbalanced panel similar to the data sets used in many other studies of
the productivity dispersion literature, such as Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013). The
design of the CSS impedes a clear distinction between the exit from the market and the
end of the obligation to participate in the survey. However, examining the EUTL data
I do not observe significant attrition among the EU ETS regulated firms.
The second compliance period of the EU ETS coincides with the world economic
crisis. In 2009, output produced and inputs employed decreased in the German manu-
facturing sector. Firms recovered quickly in the subsequent years, however consequences
of the crisis might conflate with the effect of the EU ETS during the second compliance
period. I assume that the crisis did not affect firms from the treatment and control
group differently conditional on fixed effects and firm characteristics. Among other con-
trol variables, I include capital stock, employment, energy use, and material use into the
difference-in-differences model in order to capture the variation caused by the crisis.
In this study, I focus on the direct effect of the EU ETS. I abstract from any indirect
effects, e.g. through equilibrium effects or the increase of electricity prices due to the
EU ETS.
Future research could tackle some of these issues. For example, one could investigate
the effects of the EU ETS on industry dynamics by employing structural approaches to
ideally European firm-level data.
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Appendix A. Additional information on data and descrip-
tive statistics
A.1. EUA price development
Appendix A.1. provides additional information on the EUA price development. Figure 4
shows the price series of the ICE-ECX EUA front year futures with the closest maturity.
Figure 4: EUA prices 2005 - 2013
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Notes: Source: ICE-ECX - access via Thomson Reuters Datastream.
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A.2. Free allocation and verified emissions
Appendix A.2. provides information on the free allocation and the verified emissions of
firms in the dataset. Table 8 shows the total amount of grandfathered EUAs and the
total amount of verified emissions for two digit industries.
Table 8: Number of observations by industry: total and regulated firms
Phase I Phase II
NACE Industry Free al-
location
Verified
emis-
sions
Balance Free al-
location
Verified
emis-
sions
Balance
10 Food products 10,730.32 9,695.56 1,034.76 21,471.65 18037.63 3434.02
11 Beverages 448.38 446.22 2.16 862.98 718.35 144.63
12 Tobacco products      
13 Textiles      
14 Wearing apparel 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 Leather and
related products
0 0 0 0 0 0
16 Wood and prod-
ucts of wood and
cork
1,805.56 575.27 1,230.29 5,320.81 1,029.93 4,290.88
17 Paper and paper
products
21,398.24 17,597.27 3,800.97 36,300.12 26,661.00 9,638.12
18 Printing and
reproduction of
recorded media
     
19 Coke and refined
petroleum prod-
ucts
77,947.19 77,925.31 21.88 134,922.3 124,959.69 9,962.61
20 Chemicals and
chemical prod-
ucts
38,861.04 30,589.69 8,271.35 10,1483.09 87,533.43 13,949.66
21 Pharmaceutical
products
2,276.38 1,390.66 885.73 3,108.41 2,040.37 1,068.03
22 Rubber and plas-
tic products
1,130.28 1,000.44 129.85 1,775.60 1,463.27 312.34
23 Other non-
metallic mineral
products
90,831.29 79,230.95 11,600.34 156,617.63 137,016.66 19,600.97
24 Basic metals 112,048.83 101,291.07 10,757.76 264,550.73 164,814.81 99,735.92
25 Fabricated metal
products
     
26 Computer, elec-
tronic and optical
products
     
27 Electrical equip-
ment
     
28 Machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
     
29 Motor vehicles,
trailers, and
semi-trailers
8,853.423 8,154.973 698.45 12,476.513 14,623.63 -2,147.117
30 Other transport
equipment
     
31 Furniture 0 0 0 0 0 0
32 Other manufac-
turing
     
33 Repair and instal-
lation of mach.
and equip.
     
Notes:  marks statistics that have not been released by the statistical offices due to the low number of observations.
Source: Research Data Centres of the Statistical Offices Germany (2014): Official Firm Data for Germany (AFiD)
- Cost Structure Survey and AFiD-Panel Industrial Units, own calculations.
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A.3. Matching AFiD, CSS, and EUTL
The different internal data sets of the Statistical Offices Germany, such as AFiD and
CSS, can be easily merged via plant and firm-level indentifiers. However, it requires some
effort to match external data to AFiD and CSS, since the information on firm identifiers
and names is not accessible for researchers. I match AFiD data on the firm-level with
aggregated data from the EUTL for the years from 2005 to 2012 using the commercial
register number and the VAT number. I am able to match 77 percent (813 firms) of the
firms in the EUTL with AFiD. The 238 firms that are not matched mainly belong to
the energy, public, or service sector and thus are not contained in the production census
for manufacturing.
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A.4. Descriptive statistics - full sample
Table 9 reports additional descriptive statistics on the full sample.
Table 9: Additional descriptive statistics
Mean SD Skewn Kurtosis p10 p50 p90 N
2000
Gross value added 24,969.77 233,803.09 34.88 1,436.37 1,111.46 4,473.50 36,967.21 15,107
Output 58,790.54 548,088.98 48.64 3,017.09 2,077.68 10,260.49 96,753.55 14,998
Capital stock 21,722.82 176,689.16 33.88 1,380.38 455.93 3,545.52 34,412.70 15,039
Wages and salaries 12,995.41 116,283.62 47.35 2,665.08 797.66 2,868.15 22,520.11 15,106
Energy use 46,893.63 803,001.62 60.14 4,767.93 164.10 1,660.84 30,951.67 15,106
Number of employees 294.68 2,093.58 45.16 2,458.74 27.75 85.67 547.83 15,106
R&D expenditure 2,392.66 52,273.32 48.67 2,686.61 0 0 975.5043 15,107
Exports 30,226.70 459,974.70 49.82 2,919.78 0 1,111.121 35,350.72 15,106
2005
Gross value added 27,345.33 266,307.21 39.93 2,011.60 1,173.94 4,987.07 39,760.41 13,858
Output 68,637.96 646,894.49 49.06 2,956.55 2,287.86 11,930.16 110,994.73 13,604
Capital stock 23,445.80 198,335.76 38.00 1,769.07 480.71 3,605.26 36,694.26 13,772
Wages and salaries 13,293.17 118,987.17 46.27 2,522.02 771.88 2,957.47 22,089.02 13,857
Energy use 55,565.39 793,966.15 42.11 2,313.17 275.40 2,135.74 36,675.84 13,669
Number of employees 296.61 2,106.77 44.87 2,419.63 28.25 88.92 531.25 13,857
R&D expenditure 3,082.25 62,091.20 44.90 2,293.96 0 0 1,541.87 13,858
Exports 39,977.06 560,038.10 46.71 2,517.40 0 2,106.06 48,757.09 13,857
2010
Gross value added 25,483.97 269,640.70 39.65 1,836.76 1,149.20 4,582.03 34,591.33 15,399
Output 66,443.37 709,260.71 57.04 3,867.12 2,309.90 11,687.90 106,083.33 15,250
Capital stock 21,201.18 179,555.17 39.14 1,909.50 451.18 3,404.83 33,839.90 15,324
Wages and salaries 11,785.77 105,233.78 47.18 2,613.07 749.72 2,679.64 19,384.89 15,385
Energy use 62,728.99 1,144,134.97 51.02 3,124.93 294.94 2,136.16 35,485.39 15,258
Number of employees 269.29 1,887.62 46.79 2,628.07 30.00 85.08 479.58 15,384
R&D expenditure 2,878.184 60,147.87 46.24 2,480.41 0 0 1,389.11 15,399
Exports 40,749.75 639149.50 50.55 2918.14 0 2,050.15 48,962.84 15,385
Notes: Gross value added, output (production value), wages and salaries, R&D expenditure, exports and capital
stock are denoted in EUR 1000. Energy use is denoted in MWh. Source: Research Data Centres of the Statistical
Offices Germany (2014): Official Firm Data for Germany (AFiD) - Cost Structure Survey, AFiD-Panel Industrial
Units, and AFiD-Module Use of Energy, own calculations.
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Appendix B. Capital stocks for the German production cen-
sus
Information on capital stocks is an important ingredient for several applications in empir-
ical economic research - especially productivity analysis. The official production census
of the German manufacturing sector (Amtliche Firmendaten fu¨r Deutschland; AFiD)
comprises rich information on investments on the plant and the firm-level, but does not
include information on capital stocks. In order to remedy this shortcoming, I compute
capital stocks employing the perpetual inventory method (PIM).
The basic formula of the perpetual inventory method is
Kt = Kt−1(1− δ) + It, (13)
where K denotes capital stock, δ the geometric depreciation rate and I the investment.
From the basic formula one can derive the initial capital stock K1.
K1 = I0 + I−1(1− δ) + I−2(1− δ)2 + ... (14)
K1 =
∞∑
s=0
Is(1− δ)s (15)
I follow a notation that has been also used by earlier empirical studies as for instance
Hall and Mairesse (1995). I assume the real investments to grow by the rate g.
K1 = I0
∞∑
s=0
[
(1− δ)
(1 + g)
]s
(16)
K1 = I0
(1 + g)
(g + δ)
(17)
Hence, the capital at the beginning of the first period is defined by
K1 = I1
1
(g + δ)
(18)
The PIM has been extensively used in studies that analyze sector and country level
data. In principle, it also can be applied for the computation of capital stocks based
on micro level data. However, turning from aggregate data toward micro data creates
some issues that have to be considered: First, investments are lumpy, i.e. investments
highly fluctuate over time. This property of investments on firm and plant level creates
difficulties to compute the initial capital stocks. Considering this, I compute the average
of It over all time periods available in order to estimate I1.
Iˆ1 =
∑n
t=0
It+1
(1+i)t
n
(19)
This leads us to the second issue that has to be considered when applying the PIM on
micro data: It requires the observation of single agents (plants, firms, etc) over several
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time periods. For AFiD this issue is not a problem, since the investment data is census
data. The resulting data set is a panel giving information for each year from 1995 to
2012. Otherwise it would be problematic to compute the initial capital stock. The
growth rate of capital g and the depreciation rate δ can either be assumed to take a
certain value or it can be estimated for each industry based on aggregate data. I follow
the latter approach and use aggregated data on the two-digit industry level and compute
industry specific average growth rates and depreciation rates.
In order to estimate the capital stock I use the firm-level investment data from
the AFiD-Panel Industrial Units comprising investment in machinery and equipment,
investment in buildings, and investment in properts without buildings. I deflate the
investments using two-digit industry level deflators for machinery and equipment as well
as general deflators for buildings and property without buildings. Starting from K1 I
plug the firm specific investments and the industry specific time-varying depreciation
rates into equation 13 in order to compute the entire time series of the firm’s capital
stock.
Apart from the AFiD-Panel Industrial Units, I exploit aggregate data on the two-
digit industry level. These aggregate data can be retrieved via the Destatis portal
GENESIS.17 In particular I used the tables 81000-0107 National Accounts Depreciation,
81000-0115 Gross Investment, 81000-0116 Gross Capital Stock, 81000-0117 Net Capital
Stock, and 61262-0001 Price Index Property in order to compute the growth rates, the
depreciation rates and the deflators.
Since the focus of this study lies on the firm-level, I compute the capital stocks for
firms. The method can be also employed to estimate capital stocks on the plant level.
Table 10 reports descriptive statistics of the capital stock for firms in my sample.
17https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics capital stock
Mean SD Skewn Kurtosis p10 p50 p90 N
1999 21,146.23 172,173.5 34.12 1,386.98 445.00 3,496.39 33,492.84 15,125
2000 21,722.82 176,689.2 33.88 1,380.38 455.93 3,545.52 34,412.70 15,039
2001 23,070.89 183,951.9 32.97 1,307.05 483.09 3,742.21 36,520.37 14,193
2002 23,910.89 190,909.2 32.59 1,269.70 498.21 3,867.37 37,574.70 13,603
2003 23,476.19 191,567.4 34.13 1,401.42 474.83 3,648.04 36,643.93 14,460
2004 23,071.02 191,259.8 37.10 1,684.88 472.18 3,574.86 36,549.22 14,270
2005 23,445.8 198,335.8 38.00 1,769.07 480.71 3,605.26 36,694.26 13,772
2006 23,777.36 197,148.1 37.34 1,719.16 484.33 3,666.73 37,776.86 13,405
2007 23,906.36 194,193.5 36.75 1,676.67 484.88 3,725.18 38,495.00 13,161
2008 20,665.96 174,540.6 40.26 2,021.59 450.68 3,340.48 33,742.33 16,088
2009 21,412.52 180,442.9 40.08 2,011.87 454.33 3,440.60 34,780.25 15,714
2010 21,201.18 179,555.2 39.14 1,909.50 451.18 3,404.83 33,839.90 15,324
2011 21,480.04 184,980.6 37.12 1,736.09 448.65 3,402.04 32,790.13 14,965
2012 21,393.36 189,500.1 37.90 1,795.70 433.42 3,146.24 33,135.09 14,926
Notes: Gross value added, output (production value), wages and salaries, R&D expenditure, exports and capital
stock are denoted in EUR 1000. Energy use is denoted in MWh. Source: Research Data Centres of the Statistical
Offices Germany (2014): Official Firm Data for Germany (AFiD) - Cost Structure Survey, AFiD-Panel Industrial
Units, and AFiD-Module Use of Energy, own calculations.
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